The Warehouse Paint Fire and Zero Accident Prevention
3/8/2021
It happened on May 27, 1987 in a warehouse owned and operated by a large paint manufacturer in Dayton, Ohio, where a workman, using a forklift, contacted the storage rack system while backing up. This action caused several cans of paint and flammable liquids to be knocked over. The subsequent investigation concluded that the flammable liquid spilled onto the electric motor of the forklift. Because the forklift motor was NOT rated as being intrinsically safe for contact with flammables (vapors or liquids), the liquids ignited, causing the quick propagation of fire. The lift truck operator received serious burns and was helped by other employees to put out his flames and escape. The employees quickly decided that the fire was beyond their ability to extinguish, and they evacuated without further injuries. They credited company training for knowing what to do.
The fire quickly spread through the roof, while half of the warehouse was totally engulfed in flames when the first responders (local fire department) arrived. Aerosol cans were reacting like flammable projectiles, hitting and seriously injuring fire fighters. The initial concerns were for protecting the storage area where drums of flammables were located as well as to ensure the safety of the local fire fighters. The district chief quickly decided not to let his fire fighters hook up to the sprinkler supply of the pumphouse, which was close to the wall of the warehouse and exposed to intense heat; thus endangering his crew from the exploding flammable cans, as well as the threat of a wall collapse. At this time, it was thought that the fire had propagated beyond the ability of warehouse’s automatic sprinkler system to extinguish the rising flames.
The fire spread past the warehouse fire wall, thus leaving the other half of the building in jeopardy before plans could be implemented to cut the fire off at the wall. Soon after, it was determined that the building would be a total loss. The investigation report confirmed that the warehouse sprinkler system was, indeed, overwhelmed almost immediately and had little impact to suppress the fire moments after the fires’ initial inception. Water was observed discharging from broken sprinkler piping during the initial stages of the fire.
The fire chief ordered that no water be applied to extinguish the fire. Instead, water was to be used only to protect exposures and to extinguish fires where the runoff could be monitored on paved areas. This prompted the chief to contact the director of the water department. Although the fire department avoided applying much water to the warehouse itself, the sprinkler system’s 2,500-gpm fire pump did operate for a while and there also was runoff from the systems initial release of water. Some contaminated water reached the nearby Miami River where initial efforts focused on skimming paint solvents from the river. By the fourth day, a containment dike was constructed.
In the end, the warehouse – with its contents – were destroyed. The dollar loss amounted to $32 million (that’s 1987 dollars which equates to about $74 million dollar today). Fortunately, there were no fatalities; however, the forklift operator – the only injury (outside of a sprained ankle from one of the first responders) – was seriously injured (details of the extent of his burns were not disclosed, nor was it ever mentioned if his injuries were permanent of if he had a full recovery).
The question is; “could this event been prevented as well as could the consequences of the fire and contaminated runoff been substantially mitigated so the aftermath could have been significantly reduced?”
To begin, the root cause of this event was the forklift operator backing into a storage rack system that contained highly flammable materials. Apparently, a spotter was not used and, as a result, through the operators’ erroneous judgement, or through inattention to details or complacency, the forklift contacted the flammables. Next, the forklift, which was electrically powered, was NOT rated for work in an atmosphere containing flammable vapors or dusts. OSHA, through its regulation, 29 CFR 1910.178 (Powered Industrial Trucks), has specified four designations of electric forklifts: E, ES, EE, and ES. The first two designations are merely electrically powered and are not designed to prevent contact with flammable vapors and the actual motor. EE-units are designed so the motor and all electrical equipment are enclosed, while EX-designated are designed, constructed and assembled so that they can be used in atmospheres containing flammable vapors and dusts (i.e. intrinsically safe).
The investigation noted that while the buildings’ automatic sprinkler system complied with local fire codes, it was quickly overwhelmed and concluded that the sprinkler system was not adequate for controlling this fire. In other words, the initial stages of the event involved a quick ignition of many flammable liquids almost instantaneously. Building fire suppression systems are typically designed so that when a fire initiates in a specific location, the sprinkler head in that immediate area is triggered to release water (i.e. the sprinkler head is melted by the high temperature – typically 165° F, thereby releasing water from that single sprinkler head). If a fire spreads beyond this immediate area – as was the case in this event, (due to flammable aerosols projecting beyond the immediate incipient stage), the system will be defeated as it was designed to release water to that specific location where the fire was initiated.
It was also brought out that the warehouse firewall was not effective. A firewall is a partition that has a designated rating to inhibit or stop the spread of a fire; thereby having the fire remain in a single, enclosed area. The investigation report concluded that a hole developed in the firewall. In addition, one of the fire doors (part of the fire wall) was blocked with debris and therefore, could not close.
There is some question as to what would be the most cost-effective fire protection design that would comply with the code for a warehouse such as this: one containing large quantities of highly flammable liquids. One alternative is to subdivide the building into many compartments, each with a high flow sprinkler system.
As in most cases, it is not a single event, but a scenario in which multiple controls were not properly examined or operated to a desired degree of effectiveness. Yes, the operator made a mistake that we today would categorize as a human performance condition. However, using a spotter or to have had fellow-workers – through hazard recognition training – use “stop work” authority, could have prevented this root cause. In addition, we see that the wrong piece of equipment (forklift not rated for a flammable environment) was a major contributor to this event – as the correct forklift could have controlled this event to possibly only having a few containers knocked down, without a spark igniting flammable vapors. And the fire walls and sprinkler systems being assessed which could have minimized this fire, thereby making this incident controlled, causing only minimal damage.
Always remember that your calmness under fire is your best defense in any argument or discussion
Robert Greene (16th Century Playwright)