The 1975 Kepone Incident

5/10/2021

The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 provided for the establishment of our Occupational Safety and Health Administration, known as OSHA. It’s primary purpose: to ensure a safe and healthful workplace for the American Worker. The organization is headed up by the Assistant Secretary of Labor, who in turn, reports to the US Secretary of Labor: Both positions are appointed by the President with a confirmation hearing and vote by the US Senate. However, the Secretary position holds cabinet position, thereby reporting directly to the President.

And while one of OSHA’s main duties has been to hold US businesses accountable for providing workers with proper workplace hazard controls, during its early years, OSHA found itself on the opposite side of the law, being accused for ignoring a serious health concern that resulted in several persons succumbing to a workplace toxin.

It was in 1975, when Life Science Products (located in Hopewell, Virginia), the sole manufacturer of the insecticide, Kepone, had several its employees exhibiting serious signs and symptoms from exposures to this product.  Soon after, the incident grew into an environmental nightmare as local authorities confirmed that the James River and many of its marine life were saturated with the chemical. By the end of that year, the governor shut the river down to fishing when the marine studies concluded that marine life had developed a significant uptake of the chemical.  This prompted even more investigations and the concerns began to snowball, becoming the focus of national news coverage.  

Kepone’s chemical name is chlorodecone and classified as an organochlorine. It is described as a colorless solid, however, the commercial product is a grayish-white powder.  Kepone was used in roach and ant traps in the U.S., but most was shipped to Africa and South America to control crop infestations of ants and potato beetles.

The first indications of health problems were noted when a group of workers were exhibiting serious medical conditions; most notably tremors, headaches, labored breathing, and rapid eye movements; all symptoms consistent of being poisoned by high doses of Kepone. When the story made it to the local media, Life Science was closed down by the state health department in the summer of 1975.

When workers first began noticing health problems, they went to their doctors who then told them that they were suffering from ordinary tension and were prescribed tranquilizers. Doctors and others accused the men of being drunks and alcoholics and were suffering from “delirium tremens,” or DTs. However, one doctor; a new resident from Taiwan, got one of these cases in his office, and thought there might be a poisoning issue. He sent a blood sample to the CDC in Atlanta for testing. The CDC called this doctor back and asked him about the possibility of the sample being tainted or if someone had poured or injected chemicals into it. They had never seen a sample with so much chemical content before. The doctor called the state health commission and told them about the sample. This prompted an investigation by a state epidemiologist, which, in turn, was followed with orders from the state to close the plant.  

The EPA, of course, was responsible at the federal level, but they had no idea what was going on in the years the dumping occurred. Meanwhile, one of the workers filed a complaint with OSHA, and, for whatever reason, OSHA believed the man was making a complaint about discrimination rather than safety. So, they didn’t follow up on the issue until ten months after the complaint was made. OSHA, later claimed that it was a “procedural error.”

According to the employees, Kepone was continuously handled, being transferred from one container to another. The wives of the employees said that their husbands came home looking like they were working in a flour factory. No PPE, such as gloves and respiratory protection was provided as well as any shower or decontamination was established. By the end of the year, 29 workers were hospitalized. Workers were diagnosed with extreme Kepone-blood levels, ranging from 7.5 to 11.8 ppm, when the Virginia State warning level (at this time) was 0.3 ppm.

As a result of OSHA’s poor response, both public outcry and congressional concerns caused the agency to revise its required response to workplace complaints. OSHA Area Managers were now required to ensure inspections would be performed whenever OSHA receives information regarding the existence of workplace hazard; regardless of the level of formality to which the complaint was made. Responses are now based on the severity of the hazard:

• No more than 24 hours for imminent dangers
• 3 days for serious violations
• 7 days for non-serious violations  

At the same time, various lawsuits were launched against Allied Chemical (the originator of Kepone) and Life Science Products, which resulted in large monetary settlements.

By the early 1980s the legal side was settled, and by 1988 the fishing bans were fully lifted. But even today, the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality’s website still has a fish advisory for Kepone. And while Kepone is now a banned product (In 2009, chlordecone was included in the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, which bans its production and use worldwide), it has not disappeared. Over time the sediment in the James river may have temporarily covered the toxin, but if, somehow, the silt is stirred up, another episode of environmental concerns and outrage would not be far behind.

From a “lessons learned” point-of-view, we can see that workers were not properly protected either by being supplied with PPE (gloves, disposable coveralls, booties, respiratory protection, etc.) or being trained to understand the hazards associated with Kepone (this incident occurred years before OSHA enacted the Hazard Communication regulation – 29 CFR 1910.1200 promulgated in 1983 and fully enacted by 1985).  

And while the lack of responsiveness on the part of OSHA to investigate the employee concerns was apparent, such protocol, would not have prevented workplace exposures, but rather minimize the severity of a health concern that already existed.  Prevention typically occurs through a proactive approach.  This would have required the manufacturer to make a commitment to worker S&H through recognizing effective “leading” indicators, thereby implementing hazard controls before a problem was manifested.  

Being proactive is THE tool to ensure workplace incidents – whether an injury, illness or even an environmental occurrence – are prevented. In the present work environment, ZERO Accident Philosophy has become the prevailing strategy to ensure workplace hazards are identified, assessed and addressed with effective controls. Such a strategy can only be effective through the integrated efforts of management and the workforce working together prior to the commencement of a field activity or the start-up of a manufacturing process.     

It does not matter how slowly you go so long as you do not stop

Confucius