The Hamlet Chicken Processing Tragedy
9/18/2017
It is not uncommon to reference past catastrophes to learn from their mistakes. In most cases such examples are occurrences that happened years ago. Of course, the most famous disaster that S&H professionals typically reference is the Titanic. However – and quite unfortunately – there are many other misfortunes for which we should never forget. One such event was the Hamlet Chicken Processing Plant Fire. This was an industrial fire that occurred at the Imperial Foods processing plant in Hamlet, North Carolina on September 3, 1991. As a result of this incident, 25 workers were killed and 55 were injured. And, as is the case all too often, the loss of life and the pain brought to the local community could have been prevented.
At the time of this particular incident, the Imperial Foods building was 11 years old, although the basic structure dated back to the early 20th century having adjoining structures totaling 30,000 square feet. The factory was constructed with bricks and metalwork and was one story. The interior was a maze of large rooms separated by moveable walls, and both workers and the product moved around the interior from process to process, going from front to rear. Imperial’s operators usually kept the doors of the chicken plant padlocked and the windows boarded to prevent theft, vandalism or other criminal acts. There had been no safety inspections by the state due to a lack of inspectors, yet the poultry inspector visited the site daily and knew of many fire violations. Although some workers were nervous about the locked doors, they did not voice their concerns for fear of losing their jobs.
The Hamlet plant had three previous fires, but no action was taken to prevent recurrence or to unlock the doors. In addition, there was no fire alarm system to warn workers that were stationed further back in the plant and there was no sprinkler system in the building. Another corporate facility at another location, had two major fires, one of which, in 1989, caused $1.2 million worth of damage, so the threat of fire was not an unknown concern to the company. The company had a poor safety record (although no previous fatal accidents) and was cited in the 1980s for safety violations at its Moosic, Pennsylvania, plant where violations included poorly marked or blocked emergency exits.
Management believed that an extensive fire was considered unlikely because of a lack of flammable materials throughout the complex – other than packing materials in the rear. There were open spaces between rooms which allowed for easy access by forklift trucks. The only barriers were curtains made of plastic strips to hold in refrigerated air. This would allow for rapid spread of smoke and heat in the event of a fire. The building’s previous use as an ice cream production facility meant that the walls and floor were hard, smooth surfaces, which limited the amount of material that was available to absorb heat and smoke during a fire.
There were 90 employees in the facility at the time of the fire, which began when a 25-foot deep fat fryer vat was believed to have spontaneously ignited at around 8:30 AM. This cooker’s temperature was controlled by thermostat and was maintained at 375 °F, which was variable by design to 15 °F either way. The fire spread rapidly, causing a panic so that some workers suffered trauma injuries during a rush to escape. Large quantities of smoke were produced by a combination of burning soybean oil and chicken, and melting roof insulation. This meant that the smoke generated from the fire was highly concentrated hydrocarbons and therefore was quite toxic (i.e. chemical asphyxiate).
The majority of those who escaped unharmed were workers in the front of the building who left through the unlocked main entrance, but most workers were trapped by a curtain of smoke. Others tried to escape through the locked doors by kicking them down, but without success; most of the survivors from the rear of the building got out through a loading bay. The bay was initially blocked by a tractor-trailer, but three workers went into the rear of the truck and pounded on the walls until they were heard by rescuers who moved the vehicle. Others escaped when several workers managed to break open a few of the doors (though for many this came too late).
Emergency response was delayed because telephones inside the building could not be used. The plant owner’s son drove to the fire station and informed them there that the factory was on fire but did not say that workers were still in the plant. More than 100 medical and emergency service personnel went to the scene, some of whom ran from a local hospital, while nearby towns provided emergency evacuation for the injured via four air ambulances from the local hospital to nearby burn units.
The response came under heavy criticism. Fire Chief Fuller, in charge of the emergency response, refused help from the Dobbins Heights fire department, five minutes away from the plant. The Dobbins Heights Fire Department was composed of African-American volunteers and most of the workers were also black, and there were allegations of racial prejudice from the Fire Chief (remember, the year is 1991!). Fuller defended his decision, saying at the time he refused assistance as he did not realize the doors were locked, adding “In a fire like this you need good, seasoned people.” Witnesses have also said that there were only two oxygen tanks on site to help smoke-inhalation victims.
An investigation was immediately launched by state authorities, joined one month later by federal investigators. Investigators found indentations on at least one door by people attempting to kick it down. There were concentrations of bodies around fire exits and inside a large walk-in freezer where panicked workers had sought shelter. Some sources thought they froze to death in temperatures as low as −28 °F, but the official report says they were killed by smoke inhalation which seeped into the freezer due to the door’s inability to properly seal. Twelve deaths occurred in the freezer. Five people survived there, but suffered injuries. Timothy Bradly, North Carolina’s Deputy Commissioner of Insurance, said that technically “There was not a single door in the plant that met the criteria of a fire exit.”
As it was later determined, the fire was caused by failure of a hydraulic line which powered a conveyor belt supplying the cooker vat. When the original line developed a leak, a worker originally replaced it with a new line and with new connections. Later the line, which was too long and created a tripping hazard, was shortened, but in the process the worker replaced the new end connector with the old fitting (thus the leak). When the line was brought up to normal operating pressure, it separated from the connector causing hydraulic fluid to spatter onto the heating lines for the cooker and immediately vaporized. The vapor had a relatively low flash point and erupted into a fireball. The ruptured hydraulic line then pumped 50 to 55 gallons of hydraulic fluid into the fire before the electrical failure system shut it down.
If you won’t be better tomorrow than you were today, then what do you need tomorrow for?